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“BEARS NEED ROOM TO ROAM”: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S QUESTIONABLE INTERPRETATION 
OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION 
Abstract: In February 2016, in Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service to designate 187,000 square miles in northern Alas-
ka as critical polar bear habitat. The Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of 
the District Court for the District of Alaska which found that the FWS failed 
to meet the “standard of specificity” required by the Endangered Species Act 
in determining what geographical areas constituted critical habitat. Rather, the 
Ninth Circuit focused on the ESA’s broad statutory purposes of species 
preservation and conservation, and gave great deference to the agency’s deci-
sion. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit created an impermissibly 
broad approach to critical habitat designations under the ESA. Further, this 
decision creates a dangerous precedent for the amount of deference lower 
courts may apply to agency actions in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
The destruction of natural habitats is the most critical factor impacting 
species extinction.1 Today, there are more than 1400 endangered or threat-
ened species in the United States.2 Protecting essential habitats for certain 
species of animals and plants has become increasingly difficult in recent 
years due to climate change.3 A 2004 study predicted that with the addition-
al stress on species created by climate change, fifteen to thirty-seven per-
cent of all global species could be extinct by 2050 due to climate change.4 
Congress has recognized the threat of species extinction and in 1973 enact-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Depart-
ments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 296 (1993). 
 2 Listed Animals, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (“FWS”), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/
?ref=topbar (follow “Threatened and Endangered Animals” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/QP7N-
L7KN]. 
 3 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policy Makers, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADOPTION, VULNERABILITY 1, 8 (Solomon, S. et al. eds., 2007) 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ8N-624Q] 
(analyzing the broad range of scientific evidence concerning climate change and its impacts). 
 4 Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 141, 149 (2012). The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) has done extensive research on how 
climate change has negatively affected the habitats of a multitude of animal species. Artic, WWF, 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/places/arctic [https://perma.cc/XQ6L-SPDX]. For example, the 
Artic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world due to the burning of fossil fuels. Id. This 
directly impacts the amount of ice available; many animals, such as the polar bear, depend on the 
ice for survival. Id.  
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ed the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) to prevent the extinction of plant 
and animal species and to promote their recovery.5 The legislative history of 
the ESA highlighted major concerns of the potential loss of species.6 Yet, 
agency actions and determinations made under the ESA have often come 
into conflict with opposing private and economic interests.7 
This Comment explores the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (“FWS”) 
critical habitat designation of polar bears as discussed in Alaska Oil & Gas 
Ass’n  v. Jewell.8 In February 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that the 187,000 square mile “critical habitat designa-
tion” made by the FWS for the polar bear was not “arbitrary and capri-
cious” because the FWS used the best available scientific data possible.9 
Although the ESA and its aims are incredibly important, the Ninth Circuit 
incorrectly decided Jewell.10 This Comment considers the implications of 
this decision and its effect on the regulatory framework going forward.11 
Part I of this Comment lays out the history of the ESA, the method for pro-
posing critical habitat designations under the Act, and how courts have re-
viewed these types of agency decisions in the past.12 Part II specifically ex-
amines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jewell in which the court deferred to 
the FWS’s reasoning and methods of designating large geographical areas 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Laurence M. Bogert, That’s My Story and I’m Stickin’ to It: Is the Best Available Sci-
ence Any Available Science Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 86, 90 
(1994) (explaining that the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) has been called the “most compre-
hensive piece of legislation” for species preservation by the Supreme Court and has often clashed 
with economic or private interests). 
 6 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177–78 (1978) (calling attention to how the 
threat to species extinction threatens our own “genetic heritage”). 
 7 See Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: 
Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 210 (2000) (ex-
plaining that the ESA has been named in a number of lawsuits concerning economic interests 
against species and habitat protection since it was enacted in 1973); see, e.g., Markle Interests, 
LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 827 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2016) (addressing an action brought by 
private landowners against the FWS challenging a critical habitat designation of the dusky gopher 
frog); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 248 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(addressing an action brought by the agricultural industry in New Mexico challenging the critical 
habitat designation of the southwestern willow flycatcher). 
 8 See infra notes 90–128 and accompanying text. 
 9 Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 559, 561 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the 
designation was not arbitrary and capricious even in the areas where polar bears were not actually 
present). The arbitrary and capricious standard has been described as a very deferential approach. 
Id. at 554. Critical habitat is defined in the ESA as geographical areas that the species inhabits at 
the time that the species is listed. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012). 
These areas must include “physical and biological features” that are imperative for the protection 
of said species. Id. 
 10 See infra notes 129–153 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 129–153 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 16–54 and accompanying text. 
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as critical habitat for the at-risk polar bear.13 Finally, Part III argues that the 
Ninth Court incorrectly decided Jewell and explores the decision’s poten-
tially harmful ramifications.14 This decision will continue to affect the ad-
ministration of the ESA in regard to critical habitat designations and en-
dorses an approach in which courts give unrestricted deference to agency 
action in the exercise of their statutory authority.15 
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
In 1973, Congress enacted the ESA in an effort to protect the critical 
ecosystems upon which threatened or endangered species of fish, wildlife, 
and plants depend.16 Section A of this Part discusses the background of the 
initial implementation of the ESA.17 Section B examines the method used to 
determine critical habitat designations under the ESA.18  
A. Passing the Endangered Species Act 
The passing of the ESA embodied the country’s newfound commit-
ment to not only protect the survival of endangered species, but also to 
make sure that these species are revived.19 Congress first articulated its in-
tent to take action to thwart the problem of declining species in the Endan-
gered Species Preservation Act of 1966—the first environmental statute to 
impose a requirement to utilize science in environmental decisions made by 
an administrative body.20 This law permitted the creation of a list of species 
threatened with the possibility of extinction.21 The ESA of 1973 is a much 
more comprehensive piece of legislation and calls for the use of any means 
necessary to bring all species to a state in which involvement of the ESA is 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 55–128 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 129–153 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 16 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. The ESA defines a species as endangered when it is vulnerable to 
becoming extinct in a sizable area of its habitat, and a species is threatened when, in the immedi-
ate or near future, the species could become an endangered species within a sizable area of its 
habitat. Id. § 1532. 
 17 See infra notes 19–33 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 34–54 and accompanying text. 
 19 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(3). 
 20 Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) 
(repealed by 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44) [hereinafter ESPA]. The ESPA proposed creating and main-
taining a conservation program that helped with the restoration of certain species “threatened with 
extinction.” Id. The ESPA also gave more authority to the Secretary of the Interior to administer 
the Wildlife Refuge System. Id. The ESPA was the first attempt by Congress to raise awareness 
for the growing concern of protecting wildlife and endangered species. Id. 
 21 Id. The ESPA did not contain any concrete provisions that restricted or monitored the activ-
ities of federal agencies. Darin, supra note 7, at 211. 
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no longer necessary.22 Protection of critical habitats flow largely from Sec-
tion Seven of the ESA, which prohibits federal agencies from taking, per-
mitting, or funding any action that is likely to result in the negative altera-
tion of a critical habitat.23 
The ESA directs the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to list 
endangered and threatened species for federal protection.24 The FWS then 
uses the best scientific and commercial data available to determine whether 
a species needs be listed.25 Within a year of listing a species as threatened, 
the ESA requires the FWS to designate habitats as critical to the conserva-
tion of the species.26 Section Three of the ESA defines a “critical habitat” as 
including both the occupied and unoccupied habitats that the species needs 
for recovery and that, therefore, should be protected.27 In 1978, the ESA 
was amended to redefine “critical habitat” as the first statutory definition 
did not explicitly indicate that the designation of a critical habitat included a 
protected species’ “entire range,” or the area where a particular species 
could be found in their lifetime, including areas of migration or hiberna-
tion.28 The 1978 amendments also required the Secretary of the Interior to 
consider the economic impact of the critical habitat designation on its ef-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532 (asserting that the purpose of the ESA is to create a com-
prehensive plan to protect and preserve the environments in which threatened or endangered spe-
cies depend, so much so that the protections of the ESA will eventually no longer be required). 
 23 Id. § 1536. Federal agencies are expected to participate in the conservation of endangered 
or threatened species. Id. Agencies are not allowed to act in a way that would “jeopardize” or 
harm designated critical habitats in any way. Id. 
 24 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(2) (explaining that a species cannot be removed or have its status changed 
without approval from the Secretary of Commerce). Currently, there are five species that are under 
review to determine if they are worthy of federal protection under the ESA. Brian Hires, Petitions 
to Federally Protect Five Wildlife Species Move Forward to Next Review Phase, FWS (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://www.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ref=petitions-to-federally-protect-five-wildlife-
species--move-forward-to-n&_ID=36201 [https://perma.cc/ZXK4-GYRA]. These species include 
the oblong rocksnail, tricolored bat, sicklefin chub, and Venus flytrap. Id. 
 25 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (2016). 
 26 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A), 1533(b)(6)(C). The year deadline can be extended to acquire 
additional scientific data with respect to the proposed regulation. Id. § 1533(d)(6)(a)(iii). 
 27 Id. § 1532 (5)(A)(i) (specifying that that Secretary of the Interior has the discretion to con-
sider areas as “critical habitat” that are “outside the geographical area occupied by the species”). 
 28 See James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 320 (1990) (explaining other significant 1978 amend-
ments to the ESA, such as the requirement of the FWS to consider economic impacts of critical 
habitat designation and to engage in a cost-benefit analysis). A species can be delisted or deemed 
to be “recovered” when the available science purports that the species is no longer endangered or 
threatened. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11. The process of deciding to delist a species is very similar to the 
process of adding a species to the list; it is a very scientific and involved analysis. FWS, DELIST-
ING A SPECIES 1 (2011), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/delisting.pdf [https://
perma.cc/33S7-YJ96]. After a species is delisted, the FWS continues to monitor the species for a 
period of five years to make sure that the species is able to survive without the measurements 
taken under the ESA. Id. at 2.  
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fected territory.29 Areas may not be included in the critical habitat designa-
tion if the impact on the economy is greater than the advantage of including 
that area.30 This amendment came about in reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, which prioritized the protec-
tion of the endangered snail darter over the construction of the Tellico Dam 
on the Little Tennessee River.31 This was a project on which Congress had 
spent large sums of public money, but yet the Court was willing to halt the 
project in favor of the survival of the snail darter.32 This decision marked 
not only the first interpretation of the ESA by the Court, but it also exempli-
fied a heightened level of significance placed on endangered and threatened 
species due to the fact that the Court’s holding had interpreted the ESA to 
prioritize species conservation over the aims of another federal project.33 
B. The Critical Habitat Designation Under the ESA 
The regulations under the ESA lay out specific procedures and meth-
ods that the FWS must follow in determining a critical habitat designation 
for any threatened or endangered species.34 When considering the designa-
tion of critical habitat, the FWS must focus on physical and biological fea-
tures essential for the species’ success.35 The FWS can designate areas that 
are currently unoccupied by the species in question, as long as it can show 
that the area would be considered essential for conservation.36 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Salzman supra note 28 at 320 (describing how this 1978 amendment now required the 
Secretary of the Interior to consider social implications of critical habitat designation). 
 30 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). The Secretary will also examine a critical habitat’s impact on na-
tional security. Id. 
 31 Hill, 437 U.S. at 172–73; see also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE 
DAM: HOW PORK-BARREL POLITICS ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A RIVER 4 (2013) 
(explaining that the media and the public erroneously portrayed the case as a hindrance to an im-
portant federal project). 
 32 Hill, 437 U.S. at 174. More than $110 million had been spent on the dam before it was 
halted due to litigation. Id. at 200. Congress had spent ample resources on the dam from 1967 to 
1977. Id. at 158. The project intended to bring a large number of jobs and economic benefits to the 
region. PLATER, supra note 31, at 18. 
 33 Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. The Court focused on Congress’s “plain intent” and the clear lan-
guage set out in the statute that prioritized endangered species conservation over the goals of other 
federal agencies. Id. at 196. The Court noted that Congress anticipated that Section Seven of the 
ESA would possibly require agencies to change the course of their projects in order to fulfill the 
primary aim of species conservation. Id. at 186–87. 
 34 See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (requiring the FWS to use the “best available science” when identi-
fying what constitutes a critical habitat). 
 35 See id. § 424.12(b)(1)(ii) (noting that the findings of the physical and biological features 
essential for the species are not solely limited to the region occupied by the species when it was 
originally listed). 
 36 See id. § 424.12 (deciding whether an area is essential for conservation is a determination 
that is impacted by the life history of the species, the current endangered status of the species, and 
other scientific data).  
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the FWS must take into consideration the economic implications of defining 
a particular area as a critical habitat before making its final designation.37 
The agency must also look beyond evidence of actual presence of certain 
species to areas where those species are likely to be found.38 
When the FWS proposes a critical habitat designation, it must comply 
with the rulemaking procedures laid out in the ESA.39 Once the FWS has 
decided on a critical habitat, the agency must give general and specific no-
tice of the proposed rule.40 General notice is satisfied when the FWS pub-
lishes a map of the proposed designation in the Federal Register and re-
quests public comments in accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).41 This notice and comment process provides an opportunity to 
inform affected parties of potential critical habitats in order to gain feedback 
and afford them the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.42 
Further, the FWS is required to give state agencies specific notice of the pro-
posed regulation.43 These affected parties may then submit written comments 
that are considered before the Final Rule of the habitat designation is made 
effective.44 After taking public comments into consideration, the agency pub-
lishes the final rule in the Federal Register and must include a statement 
explaining the rule’s basis and purpose.45 In the event that the approved des-
                                                                                                                           
 37 See id. § 424.19 (explaining that the Secretary of the Interior has discretion to engage in a 
cost benefit analysis, considering if the economic benefit of excluding an area from a critical habi-
tat outweighs the benefit of including the portion as part of a critical habitat). For example, in 
Jewell, the plaintiffs primarily raised concerns that the critical habitat designation for the polar 
bear would impact oil and gas development. INDUS. ECONS., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIT-
ICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS FOR THE POLAR BEAR IN THE UNITED STATES ES-5 (2010), 
https:// www.fws.gov/alaska/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/pdf/polar_bear_dea.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CR3J-4XRA]. Oil and gas associations feared that the designation would influence decisions to 
invest in the region, which would be problematic considering that oil and gas development is the 
predominant economic activity in this remote area of Alaska. Id. Oil and gas industries are subject 
to regulations that would restrict them from engaging in projects that were within one mile of a 
polar bear den. Id. at ES-8. 
 38 See Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1165–67  (9th Cir.2010) (hold-
ing that the large area designated for the Mexican spotted owl was legitimate because the ESA 
does not intend to exclude “unoccupied” areas from critical habitat designations). 
 39 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b). 
 40 Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A). 
 41 Id. Additional notice can come in the form of general newspaper circulation or a public 
hearing. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(D). 
 42 See id. § 1533(b)(4) (referencing the informal rulemaking statute in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)). The APA’s informal rulemaking procedures applies when an agency is 
engaging in informal rulemaking under congressionally delegated power. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
All agencies must engage in a notice and comment period and call for the public to participate in 
the rulemaking process. Id.  
 43 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A). The ESA provides additional procedures beyond the APA by 
requiring the FWS to specifically give actual notice to state agencies. Id.  
 44 5 U.S.C. § 533.  
 45 Id. 
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ignation of a critical habitat conflicts with what the state’s desired designa-
tion, the Secretary of the Interior must provide the state with a written justi-
fication for its decision to designate a habitat as “critical.”46 Once an area is 
designated as a critical habitat, Section Seven(a) of the ESA creates regula-
tory protections that require federal agencies to take extra precautions to 
protect the conservation of the species and to avoid negatively impacting 
the characteristics of the habitat.47  
The ESA requires that the methodology for determining what consti-
tutes a critical habitat be grounded in “the best available scientific data.”48 
The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 (the “1969 Act”) intro-
duced the “best available scientific data” requirement, which has been 
largely unaffected by the passage and implementation of the ESA only a 
few years later.49 The “best available scientific data” standard, however, 
was not more specifically defined by either the 1969 Act or the ESA.50  
The standard has been debated in light of decisions regarding the ESA, 
with the Ninth Circuit weighing in on the issue in its recent decisions.51 In 
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Locke, the Ninth Circuit not-
ed that an agency decision should only be rejected when the court cannot 
infer a rational relationship between the decision and the utilized science.52 
The court gave great deference to an agency decision under the ESA, up-
holding the National Marine Fisheries Service determination concerning 
water projects and endangered species fish; the court held that the highest 
deference to agencies should be given when reviewing an agency decision 
                                                                                                                           
 46 16 U.S.C. § 1533(i) (stating that if the Secretary of the Interior does not want to follow the 
state’s proposed comments it must provide its reasons in writing for doing so). 
 47 Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat; Implement-
ing Changes in Regulations for Designating Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7413, 7414–15 (Feb. 11, 2016) 
(later codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). 
 48 See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (stating that “this analysis will vary between species and may in-
clude consideration of the appropriate quality, quantity, and spatial and temporal arrangements of 
such features in the context of life history, status, and conservation needs of the species”). 
 49 Elizabeth Kuhn, Note, Science and Deference: The “Best Available Science” Mandate Is A 
Fiction in the Ninth Circuit, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (Oct. 23, 2016), https://gelr.org/2016/10/23/
science-and-deference/#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/X47D-BGFQ] (questioning the role of the “best 
available science mandate” considering the great deference the Ninth Circuit gives to agency deci-
sions that are based on scientific findings). 
 50 See id. (noting that Congress may not have defined “critical habitat” further because it 
wanted to continue to retrieve input from scientists before making an endangered or threatened 
species listing decision). 
 51 See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 995 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(reasoning that the intent of the best available science standard is to prohibit an agency from jump-
ing to a conclusion based on unfounded evidence). 
 52 See id. at 994 (noting that rejection of an agency decision should really only occur when 
there is absolutely no reasonable relationship between the decision and the data for which the 
science is being used). 
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with a high level of “expertise.”53 This deferential approach will be ex-
plained more thoroughly later in this Comment.54  
II. AGENCY DEFERENCE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS POLAR BEAR 
CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION 
When an agency action is challenged by an interested party, courts will 
often give a great amount of deference to the agency’s determination.55 This 
Part of the Comment will explore the idea of agency deference and how it 
applies to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jew-
ell.56 Section A will discuss why courts apply deference to agency decisions 
under the ESA.57 Section B will explain the FWS’s decision to designate 
187,000 square miles as critical polar bear habitat.58 Section C will examine 
the court’s review of the FWS’s critical habitat designation, particularly the 
analysis of the terrestrial and denning habitats and the procedural question 
of whether the FWS provided adequate written justification to the State of 
Alaska in their Final Rule.59 
A. Deference to Agency Decisions Under the APA 
The FWS has great deference in interpreting the ESA.60 Under the APA, 
the review of any agency action by the courts should be deferential and nar-
row.61 The deferential and narrow standard courts use is rooted in the Su-
preme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.62 Under a Chevron analysis, the court reviewing an 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 996. 
 54 See infra notes 55–89 and accompanying text. 
 55 Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 554 (9th Cir. 2016); Cascadia Wildlands 
v. Thrailkill, 806 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 56 See infra notes 60–128 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 60–89 and accompany text. 
 58 See infra notes 90–103 and accompany text. 
 59 See infra notes 104–126 and accompanying text. 
 60 Bogert, supra note 5, at 128; see also Chevron Deference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). Chevron deference requires the court to engage in a two-part test when reviewing 
agency action. Chevron Deference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The court will 
defer to the agency’s decision if the statute is (1) unclear, and (2) the interpretation of the statute 
by the agency was reasonable. Id.  
 61 5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (2012) (requiring the court to adhere to an agency decision unless it is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” or is 
“contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity”). 
 62 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). The case 
involved assessing an interpretation of the words “stationary source” in amendments to the Clean 
Air Act. Id. at 840. At the time of the decision, there was little to no evidence that the Court be-
lieved the case to be a pivotal administrative law decision. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 569 (7th ed. 2016) (noting that both the briefs and arguments in the case did not 
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agency determination must consider (1) whether Congress specifically ad-
dressed the question at issue and (2) if it was not addressed by Congress, 
whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable.63 After 
Chevron, courts generally give deference to the agency decision and presume 
it to be valid upon review.64 When a court does overturn an agency decision, 
that decision must have been “arbitrary and capricious,” or an action that was 
clearly contrary to law.65 The question of how to interpret the “arbitrary and 
capricious standard under the APA has been repeatedly examined by the 
Court.66 The Court has held that the standard is highly deferential; yet, the 
review should still ensure that the agency has taken relevant factors into con-
sideration and come to a reasonable conclusion.67 The Court has also stated 
that an agency action would only be set aside in extreme circumstances, such 
as when the agency had altogether failed to consider an important factor in its 
analysis or failed to provide a reasonable relationship between its decision 
and the discovered facts.68 Alternatively, deference to an agency decision is 
most crucial when a court is inquiring about a decision that is exceedingly 
technical and requires expertise only specific agencies can provide.69 
                                                                                                                           
discuss scope of review broadly but rather focused on the smaller dispute concerning the Clear Air 
Act). 
 63 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also Brandon Curtin, Comment, Deference to the Agency 
Is the Best Policy: The D.C. Circuit Applies Chevron in Denying Additional Medicare Reim-
bursements to Provider Hospitals in Washington Regional Medicorp, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 
289, 295 (2017), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3585&context=
bclr [https://perma.cc/PU8S-Y7TF] (arguing that the D.C. Circuit correctly applied Chevron by 
deferring to the Secretary of Health and Human Service’s calculation of medical reimbursements). 
 64 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (emphasizing that Chevron 
deference applies when Congress has delegated rulemaking authority by statute to the agency). 
 65 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th 
Cir.2010). 
 66 See Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (holding that a federal agen-
cy is not required to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement each time new in-
formation is brought forth that could impact the agency action in some manner). An Environmen-
tal Impact statement is required by the National Environmental Policy Act when an agency wants 
to take on a major project and requires that the agency set forth how the proposed project could 
negatively or positively affect the environment. See Environmental-Impact Statement, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 67 Environmental-Impact Statement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 68 See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration did not 
provide a rational basis for rescinding a requirement of “passive restraints” in automobiles such as 
airbags or seatbelts). The Court focused on the fact it could not defer to the agency because the 
agency jumped to a conclusion regarding the safety benefits of the “passive restraints” too quickly 
without taking important factors into consideration that were imperative to a reasoned analysis. Id. 
 69 Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377. The Court points out that even when the situation is highly tech-
nical, courts should carefully examine the record in order to determine if the agency has made a 
reasonable decision. Id. 
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Many recent cases before the Ninth Circuit have required the court to 
review agency decisions under the APA.70 The Ninth Circuit has described 
the arbitrary and capricious standard as deferential and narrow, with a high 
threshold for setting aside agency action.71 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit 
has indicated that so long as the agency looks at relevant factors and identi-
fies a connection between the situation and the choices made, the court 
should defer to the expertise of the agency and uphold the designation.72 
For example, in River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, the court examined 
whether the National Park Service acted arbitrarily or capriciously in decid-
ing to allow the continued use of motor rafts in the Grand Canyon National 
Park.73 The court found that the agency’s evaluation of relevant factors such 
as the impact on the environment (soil, water, and vegetation) and the im-
pact on the management of the national park (visitor experience and park 
operations) was sufficient; the agency had also appropriately taken the al-
ternative options into adequate consideration.74   
Due to its large geographic scope, the Ninth Circuit hears the majority of 
appeals related to ESA determinations of critical habitat designations.75 The 
states within the Ninth Circuit contain over one-hundred endangered or 
threatened species listed by the FWS.76 One notable decision, Arizona Cattle 
Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, exemplifies how the Ninth Circuit has consistently 
given deference to agencies in determining both the scope of the area set 
aside for critical habitat designation and the economic impacts worthy of con-
sideration.77 The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed a challenge to the 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (high-
lighting the high threshold required for setting aside agency action); Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunz-
man, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that agency action is only set aside by a re-
viewing court if there is a clear “abuse of discretion”). 
 71 See Martin, 593 F.3d at 1070 (underscoring the importance of giving deference to the 
agency). 
 72 See Nw. EcoSystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a decision to deny a petition to classify western gray squirrels as an endangered popula-
tion segment was not arbitrary or capricious). 
 73 Martin, 593 F.3d at 1067. 
 74 Id. at 1078. After considering alternatives that would have forbid motor rafts, the agency 
decided that these options would undermine the agency’s overall goal of providing a range of 
recreational activities for visitors. Id. 
 75 See Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 
F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016) cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __ (2018) (No. 17-133) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (noting that since the FWS is based in Washington, D.C., the D.C. 
Circuit is next in line for the number of cases heard regarding critical habitat designations). 
 76 Listed Species Believed to or Known to Occur in Each State, FWS (Oct. 15, 2017), https://
ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/species-listed-by-state-totals-report [https://perma.cc/7UL6-BRUU]. The 
Ninth Circuit includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington. Map of the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
content/view.php?pk_id=0000000135 [https://perma.cc/VQW6-G88X]. 
 77 See Salazar, 606 F.3d at 1165, 1172. 
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FWS’s critical habitat designation for the Mexican spotted owl.78 The plain-
tiffs challenged the designation as overbroad and argued that the FWS failed 
to sufficiently consider the economic impacts of the designation.79 The FWS 
argued that the ESA’s definition of critical habitat includes geographical areas 
that are used with such frequency by a listed species that the species is con-
siderably likely to be there, not just the area where the species “resides.”80 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court for the District of Arizona’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the FWS.81 The court noted that whether a 
species “occupies” an area is dependent on the specific facts of each individ-
ual case and should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.82 Additionally, the 
court reasoned that limiting occupied areas to those in which a species “re-
sides” focuses too narrowly on survival and ignores the broader statutory 
purpose of the critical habitat designation, which includes conservation.83 
Other circuits have refused to give as much deference to the agency in 
regard to critical habitat designations.84 For example, in Otay Mesa Proper-
ty, L.P. v. United States Department of Interior, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that there was not “sub-
stantial evidence” provided by the FWS to support a critical habitat desig-
nation for the San Diego fairy shrimp.85 The FWS had based the proposed 
habitat designation on eight surveys of the plaintiff’s land.86 Seven of the 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. at 1161. 
 79 Id. at 1162. 
 80 Id. at 1165. The court specified that the FWS has the authority to designate an area as oc-
cupied when the owl uses the area regularly and when the species could be spotted there within a 
reasonable time period. Id.  
 81 Id. at 1171. The court found that the FWS properly used a “baseline approach” to analyze 
the economic effect of the critical habitat designation. Id. The court found it to be correct to disre-
gard any economic impacts that would occur even if the critical habitat designation had not been 
put in place. Id. at 1173. The plaintiff’s argument rested on a “co-extensive approach” that had 
been applied in New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 248 F.3d 1277, 
1283 (10th Cir. 2001). Id. at 1172. The Tenth Circuit held that the FWS should look at any and all 
economic impacts of a critical habitat designation “regardless of whether the impacts are co-
extensive with other causes.” N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n, 248 F.3d at 1284. The court in Salazar 
believed this was too narrow and held that the FWS permissibly applied the “baseline approach.” 
Salazar, 606 F.3d at 1173–74. 
 82 Salazar, 606 F.3d at 1164. The court cautioned against situations where the FWS relies on 
inconclusive data, such as when a species uses an area of critical habitat sporadically. Id. at 1166–
67. 
 83 Id. at 1166. The court also held that the FWS did not arbitrarily or capriciously treat unoc-
cupied areas as occupied and that the amount of land designated as critical habitat for the owl was 
not disproportionate to the amount of land occupied by the owl. Id. at 1170–71. 
 84 Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 646 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 85 Id. at 918. The San Diego fairy tale shrimp was listed by the FWS as an endangered species 
in 1997. Id. The fairy shrimp is found in southern California and northern Mexico and is a small 
water animal about the size of an ant. Id. at 916. 
 86 See id. at 915 (noting that in 2001, there was a just single sighting of four fairy shrimp on 
the plaintiff’s property). 
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surveys did not find any fairy shrimp on the plaintiff’s property; yet, the 
FWS still included the property in the critical habitat designation based on 
the fact that the fairy shrimp had been identified there on one occasion.87 
The court held that this was not enough to show that the shrimp “occupied” 
the land in question.88 The substantial evidence standard applied by the 
D.C. Circuit is still a deferential standard, but the court noted that deference 
should not result in “abdication.”89 
B. The Designation of Critical Polar Bear Habitat 
On May 15, 2008, the FWS listed the polar bear as a species threat-
ened under the ESA.90 Polar bears are native to the ice-covered waters of 
the Arctic Circle.91 Polar bears rely on this icy landscape for their survival, 
but the extent and quality of the Arctic Sea ice is declining, along with the 
polar bear population.92 In 2008, the FWS studied how the decline in sea ice 
would negatively impact the polar bear population and determined that it 
would reduce the abundance of available sea-ice prey, leading to nutritional 
stress issues.93 
In 2009, the FWS proposed to designate the northern area of Alaska’s 
coast and waters as a critical habitat for the polar bear.94 In 2010, after pro-
posing a rule and holding two public comment periods, the FWS designated 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. at 918. During oral argument, the FWS used maps to show that the property in question 
was part of a “complex” of pools of water that were essential for fairy shrimp conservation efforts. 
Id.  
 88 See id. (highlighting that the court was unwilling to defer to the agency action because the 
record was “too thin” to support the designation). 
 89 Id. at 916.  
 90 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status 
for Polar Bear (Urus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,211, 28,212 (May 15, 
2008) (later codified as 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (explicitly stating that based on the best-available sci-
ence, the polar bear is likely to become an endangered species throughout “all of its range” due to 
the decline in sea ice habitats if action is not immediately taken). 
 91 Id. Polar bears evolved to utilize the Artic Sea ice and spend most of the year on sea ice and 
travel to land infrequently. Id. at 28,213. 
 92 See FWS, POLAR BEAR 1 (2014), https://www.fws.gov/alaska/fisheries/endangered/pdf/
polarbear_factsheet_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U82L-BWUE] (emphasizing that the decline of sea 
ice has the ability to impact the overall health of the polar bear and can adversely impact groups of 
the population within their most prominent geographical regions). 
 93 See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout 
Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28211, 28259-60 (May 15, 2008) (later codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 17) (indi-
cating that the lack of availability of prey could result in competition between dominant and infe-
rior polar bear populations). 
 94 Jewell, 815 F.3d at 552. Once an agency proposes a rule, it requests feedback from the 
public in the form of publically submitted comments and conducts additional research. Michael 
Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 722 (1999). The 
agency then publishes a Final Rule in the Federal Register which responds to the comments it has 
received and also creates a specific date when the rule is enforceable. Id. 
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an area of approximately 187,157 square miles as critical polar bear habi-
tat.95 The FWS identified three areas containing elements essential to polar 
bear conservation: sea ice habitat (“Unit 1”), terrestrial denning habitat 
(“Unit 2”), and barrier island habitat (“Unit 3”).96 Unit 1 included the sea 
ice that polar bears use as a platform for hunting and resting, comprising 
almost ninety-six percent of the total area designated.97 Units 2 and 3 com-
prised the remaining four percent.98 
The designation raised concerns with oil and gas trade associations, sev-
eral of Alaska Native corporations and villages, and the State of Alaska.99 
These groups wanted to make use of the natural resources in Alaska’s waters 
and North Slope.100 In 2011, these three groups filed complaints challenging 
the designation and claiming that the FWS made numerous errors in the criti-
cal habitat designation, both substantive and procedural.101 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the entire designation was improper under the ESA because the 
FWS arbitrarily designated large land and sea ice masses, but it did not identi-
fy specific areas containing the physical and biological features essential for 
polar bears.102 The plaintiffs also argued that by not adequately justifying its 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the 
Polar Bear (Urus maritumus) in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,085, 76,086 (Dec. 7, 2010) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter Designation for Polar Bear 2010]. The Federal Regis-
ter gave notice of the critical habitat designation that was to become effective on January 6, 2011. 
Id. 
 96 Jewell, 815 F.3d at 552. 
 97 See id. (noting that within each unit, the FWS pointed to essential physical and biological 
features that were critical to polar bear habitat conservation). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 553. The district court later consolidated the three cases. Plaintiff’s Unnaposed Mo-
tion to Consolidate Related Polar Bear Critical Habitat Litigation at 2, Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. 
Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Alaska 2013) (No. 3:11-cv-00025-RB) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s 
Unopposed Motion]. 
 100 See Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion, supra note 99, at 4. (noting that while all groups had 
separate interests, it made logical sense to combine the cases considering each claimed that the 
critical habitat designation violated the ESA and the APA, and all sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief). 
 101 Id. The objecting parties filed a separate action under the ESA and the APA. Id. Alaska Oil 
and Gas Association is a private, non-profit trade organization that represented fifteen oil and gas 
companies. Id. They identified themselves as the “principal industry stakeholders” operating with-
in the critical habitat for polar bears in Alaska. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 
3, Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974 (No. 11CV00025). The State of Alaska also sued as a sovereign 
state with an interest in regulating the wildlife in its jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion, 
supra note 99, at 3. The Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, a group of ten native Alaskan corpo-
rations, an Alaskan tribunal government, and the North Slope Borough, sued as well. Id. This 
group filed because they owned a substantial amount of land located within the critical habitat 
designation. Id. 
 102 Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion, supra note 99. The FWS defined “physical or biological 
features” for purposes of the definition of critical habitat as follows: 
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failure to incorporate the State of Alaska’s comments into the Final Rule, the 
FWS violated the procedural requirements laid out in the ESA.103  
C. Judicial Review of the Critical Habitat 
The district court agreed with the FWS’s habitat designation for Unit 1 
(the sea ice habitat) as critical polar bear habitat.104 The court did not en-
dorse the FWS’s designation for Units 2 and 3 (dens and barrier islands).105 
Unit 2, the terrestrial denning habitat, was intended to provide a protected 
area for the birth and acclimation of young cubs.106 The court found that the 
method used by the FWS in identifying which den sites to use was arbitrary 
and capricious because it used a five mile inland measurement, without spe-
cifically identifying where within that area all elements of a denning habitat 
were located.107 Unit 3, the portion of “barrier island habitat”, was used for 
denning, refuge, and migration along the coast to access dens and feeding 
locations.108 The district court held that that the area should only consist of 
places where current populations of polar bears exist; consequently, Unit 3 
was too broad.109 The court also held that the FWS violated the rulemaking 
requirements under the ESA because the agency did not provide an ade-
                                                                                                                           
The features that support the life-history needs of species, including but not limited 
to, water characteristics, soil type, geological features, sites, prey, vegetation, sym-
biotic species, or other features. A feature may be a single habitat characteristic, or a 
more complex combination of habitat characteristics. Features may include habitat 
characteristics that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat conditions. Features may 
also be expressed in terms relating to principles of conservation biology, such as 
patch size, distribution distances, and connectivity. 
50 C.F.R § 424.02 (2016). 
 103 See Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion, supra note 99; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(i) (2012) 
(requiring the FWS to provide a written justification when a state agency disagrees with the pro-
posed regulation).  
 104 Jewell, 815 F.3d at 553. 
 105 Id. The district court concluded that there was not enough evidence put forth by the FWS 
to show that these areas had required physical and biological features of a critical habitat, and that 
the FWS did not meet the standard of proof required under the statute. Id. 
 106 Designation for Polar Bear 2010, supra note 95, at 76,099 (explaining that polar bears 
must be able to get to potential den sites or geographical areas that assist them in raising young 
cubs). 
 107 Jewell, 815 F.3d. at 557. The FWS has used a five-mile increment measurement inland 
from the coast to define the area of designation. Id. The FWS used a U.S. Geological Survey as a 
means for creating the map. Id. at 558. 
 108 Designation for Polar Bear 2010, supra note 95, at 76,115. The barrier island habitat is 
defined in broad terms and includes not only the barrier islands themselves but also the water and 
ice surrounding the islands and any habitats on shore within one mile. Id. 
 109 Jewell, 815 F.3d at 561. 
220 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
quate justification for why it did not incorporate all of the State of Alaska’s 
comments into the Final Rule.110 
In February 2016, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, 
upholding the habitat designation entirely.111 The court held that the standard 
the FWS followed in the creation of the Final Rule was in accordance with 
the statutory purpose of promoting the recovery of the species which it seeks 
to protect.112 In reviewing Units 2 and 3, the court rationalized the FWS’s 
approach by relying on the polar bear’s nomadic nature.113 The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with the lower court’s narrow focus on the locations of where actu-
al and probable den sites of polar bears were located, noting that bears need 
“room to roam.”114 The lower court erred in believing that the area should 
only consist of places where current populations of polar bears exist.115 In-
stead, the focus should be on species preservation, and the FWS’s broad defi-
nitions of the barrier islands were permissible.116 While the plaintiffs disa-
greed with the breadth and scope of the designation, they could not specifical-
ly ascertain the evidence the FWS failed to consider.117 
Finally, the court discussed the issue of whether the FWS had provided 
adequate written justification in the Final Rule to the State of Alaska.118 This 
was the first time that this question of written justification adequacy had been 
addressed by the Ninth Circuit.119 The district court had originally faulted the 
FWS for only incorporating the its response to the State of Alaska by refer-
                                                                                                                           
 110 Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the procedure was still correct, even though under the 
statute, the FWS should have specifically sent the letter to the Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game, rather than to Alaska’s governor. Id. The letter also did not specifically include verbatim 
responses. Id. 
 111 Id. at 550. The court focused on deferring to an agency using a narrow standard, especially 
when the action is “considered and rational.” Id. at 554. The threshold was considered very high 
by the court to discredit a decision made by an agency. Id. 
 112 Id. at 556. The court looked closely at the critical habitat designations by the FWS for 
Units 2 and 3. Id. at 556–61. Specifically, for Unit 2, the Ninth Circuit stated that the FWS used a 
rational mapping methodology in determining which denning areas were used by the polar bear. 
Id. at 558. The five-mile demarcation from the coast used by the FWS was considered by the 
Ninth Circuit to be a rational and well-supported method, considering that some bears den as far 
as fifty miles away from the coastline. Id. 
 113 Id. at 559. The FWS’s argument was largely based on the nomadic nature of the species. 
Id.  
 114 See id. (focusing on the fact that polar bears are mobile and that while they may tend to 
stay loyal to particular denning areas, they do not always stay in one particular den). 
 115 Id. at 561. 
 116 See id. (stating that the designation aligned with the underlying purpose of the ESA). 
 117 Id. at 562. The court did not require any more specificity in their determinations than they 
had already made. Id. 
 118 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii) (requiring the FWS to give state agencies notice of a 
proposed regulation and to provide an explanation to the state if they decide to provide input). 
 119 Jewell, 815 F.3d at 562. The court adopted the D.C. Circuit’s approach that reviews only 
whether the FWS satisfied § 4(i) of the ESA from a procedural standpoint and will not substan-
tively look at the written justification itself. Id. 
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ence to a letter to the governor after the Final Rule was adopted; the district 
court stated that this was inadequate.120 The Ninth Circuit, however, took a 
more permissive approach in interpreting what was required under the 
ESA.121 The court concluded that including the response by reference was 
sufficient under the ESA.122 By stating its positions clearly in the Final Rule, 
rather than specifically addressing each of the State of Alaska’s comments, 
the court found that the FWS had still satisfied the statutory standard.123 
The court’s decision highlights that considering the statutory purpose 
of species protection, it would be unreasonable to limit protections for polar 
bears only to areas used by existing, threatened populations of polar 
bears.124 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the FWS’ assertion that the district 
court held the agency to a level of precision that was not required by the 
ESA.125 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the method used was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or contrary to law because the agency provided a rational rela-
tionship between the scientific facts available and the decision made.126 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the agency’s evaluation of what was 
necessary for species conservation.127 The Ninth Circuit stated that the low-
er court had held the FWS to an unnecessarily high standard of specificity.128 
III. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S PERMISSIVE  
CRITICAL HABITAT STANDARD 
This Part explains why the permissive standard applied by the Ninth 
Circuit could be a problematic interpretation of the ESA.129 At the time that 
the critical habitat designation was created for the polar bear, the FWS con-
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at 563. The district court found that the FWS should have specifically incorporated all 
its comments into the Final Rule, but it failed to do so and thereby violated § 4(i) of the ESA. Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. The court found that it was clear from the record that all comments were responded to 
in some shape or form, and that the statute does not require that the state is content with the pro-
vided justifications. Id. 
 123 Id. Due to the fact that this was a procedural question, the Ninth Circuit decided not to 
specifically consider the content of the answers provided by FWS in addressing the concerns of 
the State of Alaska. Id. at 563–64. 
 124 Id. at 556. 
 125 Id. at 555. The district court required the FWS to provide specific and tailored evidence of 
areas the polar bears used throughout Units 2 and 3. Id. For example, for Unit 2, the district court 
believed the FWS should have identified specific den sites. Id. The Ninth Circuit said that this was 
too specific; the FWS should not use such a narrow construction. Id. Specifically, the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that the ESA “requires the use of best available technology, not perfection.” Id. 
 126 Id. at 556. 
 127 See id. at 554, 562 (highlighting that the FWS acted reasonably under what the ESA re-
quired).  
 128 Id. at 556. 
 129 See infra notes 130–153 and accompanying text. 
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sidered the designation to be a fairly inconsequential action.130 The FWS 
believed that no additional regulatory changes, minor economic impacts, or 
slight changes to polar bear conservation requirements would occur.131 
Consequently, the decision in Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell arguably 
embodies a change in law that raises questions of how the FWS may ap-
proach critical habitat designations going forward.132 
The Ninth Circuit created a permissive standard for the FWS to make 
critical habitat designations using the best available science.133 The court in 
Jewell found that the FWS used the best possible methodology in determining 
the critical habitat designation because they used the scientific data that was 
available to them.134 The court made a point of stating that the broad geo-
graphical scope of the designation was consistent with the statutory purpose 
of sustaining the preservation of polar bears; therefore, the designation was 
not arbitrary or capricious.135 Potential problems arise from the fact that cur-
rently the best available science requirement is met as long as the agency 
takes the available data into account.136 In 1992, the Ninth Circuit held that 
even if the data is weak, the reliance on that questionable data would not au-
tomatically render an agency decision arbitrary or capricious.137 Further, Jew-
ell is not the latest Ninth Circuit case to give such deference to the FWS when 
examining the utilized scientific methodology.138 The Ninth Circuit has also 
continued to apply such a permissive standard in its more recent decisions.139 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See INDUS. ECONS., INC., supra note 37, at ES-4 (noting that the foreseeable economic 
impacts of a critical habitat designation would be considered minor and that they were “limited to 
additional administrative costs”). The Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari outlines the harm-
ful impacts on the economy this decision could have for the State of Alaska, especially consider-
ing that the oil and gas reserves are important resources for the state and national economies. 
Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 32. 
 131 INDUS. ECONS., INC., supra note 37, at ES-4. 
 132 See Maria L. Banda & Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in National Courts: Recent 
Trends and Developments in Global Climate Law, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,121, 
10,134 (2017) (noting that Jewell gives nod to the importance of recognizing the future impact of 
climate change as a relevant portion of critical habitat designation determinations). 
 133 See Kuhn, supra note 49 (noting that the Ninth Circuit tends to give a large amount of 
deference to an agency, especially in the context of a scientific or technical question). 
 134 Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 562 (9th Cir. 2016). The FWS also con-
sulted with polar bear experts in its determination. Id. at 552. 
 135 See id. at 556 (stressing the importance of the statutory purpose of conservation and indi-
cating that it would make “little sense to limit its protections”). 
 136 Kuhn, supra note 49. The agency is free to use data that may be considered unreliable if 
there is no other data available. Id. 
 137 See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1336 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
FWS’s “Finding of No Significant Impact” was supported by sufficient evidence to fulfill the 
statutory requirement). 
 138 Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 681 (9th Cir. 2016). The Alaska Oil and 
Gas Association brought an action against the National Maritime Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) due 
to its decision to add a subspecies of Pacific bearded seals to the endangered list under the ESA, 
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It is possible that the Ninth Circuit would continue to approve critical 
habitat designations on remarkably large geographic areas with a minimal 
supportive scientific data.140 This could set a precedent for even more prob-
lematic decisions in the future.141 Such a lax standard may promote forum 
shopping and an increase in venue disputes in order for aggrieved parties to 
avoid a ruling under the permissive Ninth Circuit standard.142 Plaintiffs may 
attempt to bring suit in the D.C. Circuit where the FWS is based.143 As pre-
viously discussed, the D.C. Circuit’s “substantial evidence” standard argua-
bly raises the bar for agency deference and, therefore, could result in more 
favorable results for plaintiffs than if they brought suit in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.144 Further, these types of decisions could have significant and lasting 
effects on state economies.145 In Alaska, the approval of the polar bear criti-
cal habitat designation creates a regulatory burden on oil and gas explora-
tion efforts, which could adversely impact job creation and economic 
growth.146 If the Ninth Circuit’s permissive approach continues to control 
the review of critical habitat designations by the NWS, the implementation 
of the ESA will have little judicial oversight.147 
                                                                                                                           
arguing that the population of seals was “plentiful” and that the scientific data used by the agency 
was questionable in nature. Id. at 675. 
 139 Id. at 675. The NMFS used two distinct approaches to determine the impact of water tem-
peratures on seals and sea ice. Id. at 672. Their findings estimated that certain types of sea ice 
would be completely eliminated by 2050. Id. at 679. An independent reviewer opined that seals 
would continue to disappear. Id. at 680. 
 140 Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75, at 32. 
 141 See id. (arguing that the Jewell decision creates a dangerous precedent that allows for the 
continued designations of vast regions as critical habitats, even though this may directly contradict 
with Congress’ original intent in creating the ESA). 
 142 Forum Shopping, BLACK LAW’S DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Forum shopping is defined 
as follows: 
The practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim 
might be heard. A plaintiff might engage in forum shopping for example by filing a 
suit in a jurisdiction with a reputation for high jury awards or by filing several simi-
lar suits and keeping the one with the preferred judge. 
Id. 
 143 See Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75 (noting that since the FWS is 
based in Washington, D.C., the D.C. Circuit is next in line for the number of cases heard regarding 
critical habitat designations). 
 144 See Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 646 F.3d 914, 916, 918 (D.C. Cir. 
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 147 Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75, at 31. 
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 The Supreme Court will soon be able to provide insight into the ad-
ministration of the ESA and the deference given to agency determinations.148 
On January 22, 2018, the Court granted certiorari to a case from the Fifth Cir-
cuit, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States. Fish & Wildlife Service, involving  
the FWS’s designation of private Louisiana land as critical habitat for the 
dusky gopher frog.149 The private land at issue, however, currently contains no 
gopher frogs, and the FWS concedes that the designation could result in major 
economic loss for the landowners.150 The FWS argues that the area is essential 
because it could provide an important breeding site for species recovery in the 
future.151 The Court will address the question of whether the ESA prohibits 
private land as being designated for critical habitat if it is currently unoccupied 
by the species.152 The Court will have an opportunity to strike a greater bal-
ance between species preservation and economic or private interests.153 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell creates 
an impermissibly broad standard in approaching critical habitat designa-
tions. While the ESA was created with the intent to protect and conserve the 
numerous populations of threatened species in the United States, the Ninth 
Circuit has overly broadened the scope of the FWS’s discretion. Aggrieved 
parties would be wise to avoid the Ninth Circuit if they hope to find any 
relief under the ESA. It is up to the other circuits to provide a framework 
for answering these questions in the face of impending climate change and 
continued rates of species extinction. Other circuits should avoid the broad 
and lenient view taken by the Ninth Circuit that considerably undermines 
the plain language of the ESA. 
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